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INTRODUCTION
The study of law and religion has tended to focus on debates
over “church and state.” The central question has been how the law
ought to structure the relationship between religion and the
government. Many of the legal conflicts over religion, however, take
place in a commercial context. They are thus not simply puzzles of
how God and Caesar should interact. They also present the question
of how the law should structure the relationship between God and
1
Mammon. The exploration of co-religionist commerce by Professors
2
Michael Helfand and Barak Richman is important because it places
the law of church and market at center stage. Rather than viewing the
intersection of commerce and religion as simply one more stage for
church-state conflicts, they focus on the legal regulation of religious
commerce. Their work reveals the dangers of uncritically applying
law developed in other contexts to religious commerce. In so doing,
they demonstrate the need for explicit reflection on the proper
relationship between religion and the market and how the law should
structure that relationship.

Copyright © 2015 Nathan B. Oman.
† Professor of Law and Robert & Elizabeth Scott Research Professor, William & Mary
Law School. I would like to thank Michael Helfand, Paul Horwitz, and Barak Richman for
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Essay. All errors are mine. As always, I thank
Heather.
1. Mammon is a Biblical term meaning material wealth or possessions that have a
debasing influence.
2. Michael A. Helfand & Barak D. Richman, The Challenge of Co-Religionist Commerce,
64 DUKE L.J. 769 (2015).
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This Essay uses Helfand and Richman’s fine article to raise the
question of the law of church and market. In Part I, I argue that the
question of religion’s proper relationship to the market is more than
simply another aspect of the church-state debates. Rather, it is a topic
deserving explicit reflection in its own right. In Part II, I argue that
Helfand and Richman demonstrate the danger of creating the law of
church and market by accident. Courts and legislators do this when
they resolve questions religious commerce poses by applying legal
theories developed without any thought for the proper relationship
between church and market. Finally, in Part III, I examine one of the
few areas in our law where we do explicitly try to structure the
relationship between commerce and religion: antidiscrimination laws.
I argue that the assumptions about the proper role of religion in the
market on which these laws are predicated are actually quite different
than the ultimately contractual regime that Helfand and Richman
assume. While antidiscrimination laws do not directly implicate the
doctrinal issues flagged in their article, the theoretical gap between
their approach and antidiscrimination law illustrates the need for
greater attention to the law of church and market.
I. THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE LAW OF CHURCH
AND MARKET
The “law of church and state” is a familiar part of the intellectual
landscape for American lawyers, judges, and professors. We are well
equipped with theories, metaphors, and intuitions about the proper
relationship between the state and religious believers and institutions.
This does not mean, of course, that there is any widespread
agreement on precisely what shape this relationship should take.
Brian Leiter, for example, argues that there is no reason to afford any
particular legal solicitude to religious exercise, yet Congress enacted
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, exempting religious
believers from otherwise neutral laws burdening activities required by
3
their faith. We also have an abundance of metaphors: walls of
4
separation, public squares from which religion should or should not

3. See generally BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012) (arguing that the
idea of specifically religious toleration is incoherent); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2006)
(The Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
4. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (“In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation
between Church and State.’” (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878))).

OMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

A LAW OF CHURCH AND MARKET

4/10/2015 12:19 PM

143

5

be excluded, and even the marketplace of religious competition from
6
which the state remains aloof. Most everyone comes to the subject
with well-formed opinions of either the separationist or
accomodationist variety, and debates on church and state tend to play
out with the comforting predictability of a well-practiced minuet.
When it comes to the proper relationship between religion and
the marketplace—the real, commercial marketplace, not the
metaphor of First Amendment doctrine—the issue becomes more
interesting. Here, we lack a clear set of theories and metaphors
specifying what role, if any, religion should play in commerce. To be
sure, we have a great deal of law that deals with religion and a great
7
deal of law that regulates the market. There are thus no shortage of
arguments and theories that can be repurposed from one field or
another to guide the law on how it should mediate the relationship
between religion and the market. We have, however, a paucity of
8
theories that are native to the problem. Hence, when we look at laws
regulating religion in the commercial context we tend to view them as
simply another example of a “church-state” problem. We then
proceed with our analysis, not pausing to consider that in resolving

5. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 907 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part) (“Perhaps in recognition of the centrality of the Ten Commandments as
a widely recognized symbol of religion in public life, the Court is at pains to dispel the
impression that its decision will require governments across the country to sandblast the Ten
Commandments from the public square.”). But see generally RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE
NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1988) (arguing
that religion has been wrongly excluded from the public square in American political debates).
6. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (expressing that when the state creates “an expressive marketplace”
it cannot exclude religious viewpoints).
7. In support of this claim, I can cite treatises or casebooks on law and religion. The mind,
however, boggles at what one should cite to summarize the law regulating the market because of
the sheer size of the literature. See generally MICHAEL MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY &
THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2002) (collecting key cases and
materials on law and religion).
8. This is not entirely true, of course; there are scholars who have examined the legal
relationship between commerce and religion. See generally Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby
Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154 (2014) (discussing religious activity by for-profit corporations);
Alan Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm:
Why For-Profit Corporations are RFRA persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273 (2014) (same);
Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887 (2009) (discussing
commercial activities by religious organizations); James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated,
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565 (discussing religious activity by for-profit corporations); Mark L.
Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 59 (2013) (same); Mark Tushnet, Do For-Profit Corporations Have Rights to Religious
Conscience?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 70 (2014) (same).
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such conflicts we are inevitably instantiating a particular vision of how
religion and commerce ought to relate to one another. We create the
law of church and market by accident, without thinking about it. The
proper relationship between commerce and religion and the law’s
role in shaping that relationship, however, is a topic worthy of
concern in its own right. To be sure, any time we consider how the
law should treat religion, we are dealing with the “law of church and
state.” When we look at religion and the market, however, we are
doing more than simply playing out the minuet of church-state
arguments on yet another stage. The market is a central social
institution, one meriting careful reflection in its own right, including
reflection on the role of the religion.
The problem is exacerbated when we take note of the way that
religion has come to be understood over the last few centuries,
particularly in legal discourse. For Western legal thinkers prior to the
end of the seventeenth century, “religion” was an all-embracing
category of life and thought—the primary context in which other
9
activities, including the activity of “law,” occurred. With the
dénouement of the wars of religion and the rise of modernity,
however, religion increasingly came to be conceptualized by legal
thinkers as a fairly circumscribed area of life, one whose heartland lay
in the realm of private worship and belief. The “law of church and
state,” as we currently view it, rests on the assumption that there is
some fairly circumscribed corner of social life that we can label
“religious.” Under this assumption, the only question is how the law
should relate to this limited sphere. The problem, however, is that
many religious traditions have never really accepted the idea that
“religion” is an activity confined to a relatively circumscribed space.
Rather, for many believers, religion is a vital force that informs their
activity in counting houses just as much as in houses of prayer. The
“law of church and state” as a category of thought, however, tends
toward a far more circumscribed—and, hence, less realistic—view of
religious activity.
Professors Helfand and Richman have done a great service by
bringing co-religionist commerce—and with it the question of the
proper relationship between religion and the market—to center stage.

9. Strikingly, in the Middle Ages the term “law” was used to refer to what today we would
call “a religion.” Hence, Christianity was referred to as “the law of Christ,” Judaism as “the law
of Jews,” and so on. See REMI BRAGUE, THE LAW OF GOD: THE PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY OF
AN IDEA 107 (2008).
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In thinking about the law of church and market, their article does two
things. First, it offers a straightforward and attractive model of how
religion and commerce ought to interact. Stated briefly, Helfand and
Richman implicitly assume that the relationship of church and market
ought to be mediated by autonomous choice. It is for the participants
in market transactions to decide for themselves what role religion
should play in commercial agreements. The law should seek to
discern the intent of contracting parties and enforce their agreements.
So long as the resulting legal obligations were agreed to, the law
should enforce co-religionist contracts, even if they have religious
content. Second, they demonstrate how law developed in a noncommercial context—in this case the New Formalism in contract law
and Establishment Clause doctrine—tends to undermine freedom of
contract for co-religionist commerce.
II. ACCIDENTAL LAWS OF CHURCH AND MARKET
According to Helfand and Richman, the central legal challenge
for co-religionist commerce is the “translation problem” that arises
when religious actors call on the courts to give legal effect to
10
This translation
religiously infused commercial transactions.
problem is exacerbated by two legal developments—the New
Formalism and Establishment Clause Creep—that limit the ability of
courts to take notice of the religious content of commercial
arrangements. There are two things worth noticing about this framing
of the problem. First, it implicitly offers up contract as the proper
regime for structuring the law of church and market. Second, both the
New Formalism and Establishment Clause Creep offer alternative
models for the law of church and market, models that are to some
extent inhospitable to religious commerce. Neither of these models,
however, is native to the question of the proper relationship between
church and market. Rather, they were developed with other questions
in mind, and the answers they give to the questions posed by coreligionist commerce do not represent any reasoned conclusion about
the proper relationship between faith and commerce.
A. The New Formalism
In adopting contract as the mechanism for structuring the
relationship between religion and commerce, Helfand and Richman

10. Helfand & Richman, supra note 2, at 782.
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implicitly defend a vision of the market that is essentially pluralistic.
11
In this vision, the market does not serve a single purpose. Rather, it
is a space in which mixed motives abound and individuals with
12
potentially very different visions of life cooperate voluntarily.
Hence, a religiously themed business—say, a producer of Kosher
meat products—exists both to make a profit and to facilitate the
living of a pious Jewish life. A Sharia-compliant investment
instrument exists both to earn a reasonable rate of return for Muslim
savers without violating the Qur’an’s prohibition on riba and to
provide financing to thoroughly secular enterprises, such as
13
municipalities. None of these aims can claim pride of place. A
Kosher butcher who adheres with perfect fidelity to the laws of
kashrut but fails to make a profit is a failure. Likewise, an Islamic
bank cannot substitute junk bonds for a bai’ al’inah (sale and buyback agreement) even though the junk bonds might earn a higher rate
14
of return. Rather, the “correct” treatment of a given transaction can
only be given by the actual agreement of the parties. It is their choice
that legitimizes the balance struck between religion and commerce,
not the particular content of their agreement.
This view is familiar to autonomy theorists of contract, who
ground contractual obligation in the free choices of contracting
15
parties. As Helfand and Richman demonstrate, however, the New
Formalism in contract interpretation frequently frustrates the
intentions of religious parties by adopting aggressive versions of
16
textual interpretation and the parol evidence rule. The New
Formalism ultimately flows from a far less pluralistic vision of the

11. For an exploration of pluralistic, non-efficiency based defenses of the market, see
DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
MARKETS 15–26 (2010); see also Nathan B. Oman, Markets As a Moral Foundation for Contract
Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 183 (2012) (discussing non-efficiency based defenses of the market).
12. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 5 (1992) (discussing markets as an
institutional mechanism for cooperation in pluralistic societies).
13. See generally MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
PRACTICE (2006) (providing a summary to the current practice of Islamic banking); TIMUR
KURAN, ISLAM AND MAMMON: THE ECONOMIC PREDICAMENTS OF ISLAMISM (2004)
(discussing the role of Islam in Muslim thinking about commerce and the rise of so-called
Islamic economics).
14. See HANDBOOK OF ISLAMIC BANKING 135 (M. Kabir Hassan & Mervyn K. Lewis eds.,
2007) (discussing bai’ al’inah transactions in Islamic finance).
15. See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 54–77 (2004) (summarizing promissory
theories of contract).
16. See Helfand & Richman, supra note 2, at 788–89.
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market than the one that Helfand and Richman implicitly assume.
Consider the work of Robert Scott and Alan Schwartz, who have
argued for a particularly stringent view of the parol evidence rule, one
that would frustrate the kind of highly contextual interpretation
18
favored by Helfand and Richman for co-religionist commerce. Scott
and Schwartz in effect argue that profit-maximizing firms that are
repeat players in contract litigation view their contracts like an
19
investment portfolio. When these contracts end up in litigation,
courts sometimes err by either deciding the case in way that hurts the
firm or by deciding the case in way that helps the firm and provides a
windfall. As long as the errors are randomly distributed, “bad”
decisions will cancel out “good” decisions. By adopting a stringent
version of the parol evidence rule, courts lower litigation costs while
creating greater volatility in litigation outcomes. Firms, however,
diversify away the risk of such volatility by having many contracts
and, thus, reaping the benefits from lower litigation costs generated
by the strict parol evidence rule.
This is not the place to pass judgment on Schwartz and Scott’s
argument. Rather, I want to note that it—along with similar
arguments offered by partisans of the New Formalism—rests on a
20
relatively monistic conception of markets. On this view, markets
exist to efficiently allocate resources, and the law that structures the
market should be specified so as to maximize profits narrowly
construed. Notice that, in order for the argument of Scott and
Schwartz to work, firms must regard contracts as essentially fungible
and commensurable. In effect, each contract becomes little more than
a security in a diversified portfolio—a legal right that will deliver a
certain amount of cash depending on the vagaries of law and the
market. This is what allows firms to net out the gains and losses from
judicial errors and reap the benefits of lower dispute-resolution costs.
This monistic conception of the market, however, runs up against the

17. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 544–45 (2003) (arguing that the sole concern in contracts between
corporations should be economic efficiency); see generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002) (arguing that efficiency should be the sole
concern in specifying contract law, property law, and other legal regimes).
18. See generally Schwartz & Scott, supra note 17 (arguing against contextual
interpretation in commercial contracts).
19. See id. at 574–78.
20. See id. at 544–45 (arguing that efficiency should be the sole concern in contracts
between corporations).
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more pluralistic approach implicitly taken by Helfand and Richman,
who are willing to incur greater litigation expenses in order to get
outcomes that more closely conform with the religious intentions of
21
the parties in each transaction. As they demonstrate, co-religionist
commerce has in at least some cases been a victim of a narrow
conception of the market. The New Formalism, of course, in no sense
developed as a normative theory of the relationship between religion
and commerce. Rather, in this instance co-religionist commerce is a
victim of legal theories developed to address quite different problems
and repurposed without much thought to serve as a law of church and
market.
B. Establishment Clause Creep
The same is true of the Establishment Clause Creep that Helfand
22
and Richman identify. The decades before and after the Civil War
marked a period of religious schism. American denominations such as
the Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians split along regional lines
23
over the issue of slavery. In 1871, one of these disputes reached the
24
U.S. Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones. The case involved a split
within a Louisville, Kentucky congregation between supporters of the
Presbyterian Church of the United States of America and the
25
Presbyterian Church of the Confederate States of America. The
rival factions both claimed to be the true successors of the original
26
church and therefore the owner of its property. Rather than trying to
resolve this issue on the ecclesiastical merits, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that because the Presbyterian Church was a hierarchical
organization, the courts had to defer to the larger denomination’s
judgment as to which of the rival factions represented the true
27
successor to the original church. In adopting this rule, the Court
21. Helfand & Richman, supra note 2, at 802.
22. Id. at 803–10.
23. See Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church Power and
Property Before the Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307, 358–69 (2014) (discussing schisms over
slavery before the Civil War and the resulting litigation involving churches); Lucas P. Volkman,
Church Property Disputes, Religious Freedom, and the Ordeal of African Methodists in
Antebellum St. Louis: Farrar v. Finney (1855), 27 J. L. & REL. 83, 86–89 (2012) (discussing
schisms within the Methodist church over slavery).
24. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
25. See id. at 690–94.
26. See id. at 684–86.
27. See id. at 727–28. In this case the Court held that civil courts had to defer to the
decision of the Presbyterian Church of the United States. While the Presbyterian Church of the
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rejected the approach taken by the British courts in disputes over
28
church property. The practice in the British courts was for the judge
to determine which claimant to church property was the theologically
29
true successor to the original congregation. The Court rejected this
approach because in America, it stated, “The law knows no heresy,
and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no
30
sect.” A short time later, the Court heard a case involving a schism
within a Methodist congregation, in which it ruled that because
Methodism adopted a congregational rather than a hierarchical
model of church governance, the civil court should award control of
church property to the faction that commanded a majority of the
31
original congregation’s members. While these cases were not
decided on Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause grounds, in
the twentieth century Watson v. Jones was repurposed as a First
Amendment precedent and the Court issued a series of decisions that
limited the ability of courts to inquire into religious questions in the
32
context of disputes over church property. Tellingly, these decisions
shifted away from Watson v. Jones’s emphasis on neutral principles in
favor of a regime in which courts were deemed to simply lack the
competence to judge disputes between religious parties.
My goal here is not to comment on the doctrinal intricacies of
the Court’s church-property cases or to question Helfand and
Richman’s analysis of how that doctrine has been expanded to
33
frustrate co-religionist commerce. Rather, I wish to call attention to
Confederate States still existed as late as 1866, the Court never explained why civil magistrates
shouldn’t have deferred to the Confederate ecclesiastical organization. See id. There are two
possibilities. By the time of the litigation, the Presbyterian Church of the Confederate States
may have ceased to exist. Alternatively, the Court may have decided that it must defer to the
Presbyterian Church of the United States because it was undisputed that the Louisville
congregation had originated with this denomination.
28. See id. at 727–29.
29. See Pearson v. Attorney General, [1835] 58 Eng. Rep. (Ch) 848, 854–55, aff’d, Shore v.
Attorney General, [1839] 8 Eng. Rep. (H.L.) 450 (holding that church property of a dissenting
sect could not be controlled by church members that rejected Trinitarianism in favor of
Unitarianism).
30. Watson, 80 U.S. at 729.
31. See generally Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. 131 (1872) (resolving a dispute over church
property involving an African-American Methodist congregation in the District of Columbia).
32. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); Serbian Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevick, 426 U.S. 696, 710–12 (1976); Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S.
367, 367 (1970) (per curiam); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445–46 (1969);
Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 190 (1960) (per curiam); Kendroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115 (1952).
33. Helfand & Richman, supra note 2, at 803–08.
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the fact that none of the case law developed by the Supreme Court in
this area arose out of commercial disputes. Indeed, this is the
quintessential example of a church-state problem where the
government is called on to make decisions regarding the allocation of
power and control within a religious organization. The courts speak
of neutral principles of contract law, but originally the framework was
not developed in the context of commercial contracts but
ecclesiastical schisms. As Helfand and Richman demonstrate, when
an expansive reading of these cases is applied to co-religionist
commerce, it tends to have the effect of disabling the courts from
providing support to such commerce in the form of contractual
34
enforcement. The Court developed these doctrines in order to
separate—insofar as possible—secular courts from internal
theological disputes within religious organizations. When this effort
to separate church and state is applied to co-religionist commerce,
however, it tends to have the effect of separating church and market.
There is no reason to suppose that this was the intention of the Court
in promulgating these doctrines, and in any case none of the courts
applying these doctrines offer any sustained defense of legal hostility
to religiously infused commerce. Rather, we end up with a
separationist stance on church and market that arose accidentally by
repurposing a set of legal doctrines to answer a set of questions that
they were never designed to resolve.
The challenges of New Formalism and Establishment Clause
Creep to co-religionist commerce demonstrate the problems of
constructing a law of church of market without thinking about it.
Courts import legal approaches from contexts unrelated to religious
commerce and in effect construct the law of church and market by
accident. Helfand and Richman seem to have a theory about the
proper relationship between commerce and religion. Their article
accepts contract as a proper law of church and market. Freedom of
contract is so closely associated with a market regime that it seems a
natural way of structuring the relationship between religion and
commerce. The desirability of this approach, however, cannot be
taken as self-evident. Freedom of contract has not always structured
even ordinary commercial relationships. Strikingly, in the one area
where our law does rest on explicit reflection about the proper
relationship
between
commerce
and
religion,
namely

34. Id. at 803–10.
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antidiscrimination law, it has rejected freedom of contract as a master
norm.
III. AN INTENTIONAL LAW OF CHURCH AND MARKET
At times partisans of freedom of contract romanticize the legal
world before the rise of the modern regulatory state as a period when
35
voluntary private ordering structured the market. Such a view tends
to oversimplify the past. Rather, as Henry Sumner Maine famously
remarked, the “the movement of the progressive societies has
36
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.” One can
envision market participants as occupying certain roles, roles that
impose on those participants legal duties in the absence of consent
and even in the face of an unwillingness to contract. Blackstone gave
the example of common carriers and innkeepers. “[I]f an inn-keeper,
or other victualer, hangs out a sign and opens his house for travellers,
it is an implied engagement to entertain all persons who travel that
37
way,” he wrote. “[U]pon this universal assumpsit an action on the
case will lie against him for damages, if he without good reason refuse
38
to admit a traveller.” Such a duty implies the inability of certain
market actors to resist contracting with someone without good cause.
The duty in some circumstances to contract with all comers existed at
common law, and has been enacted in modern antidiscrimination
39
statutes. These statutes often include religion as a protected category
and thus seek—in part—to structure the relationship between church
and market on a non-contractual basis.

35. See Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contract Large: Contract Law through the
Lens of Laissez-Faire, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, 25–26 (F. H.
Buckley ed., 1999) (suggesting that prior to the rise of the post–New Deal regulatory state a
largely laissez-faire approach to markets prevailed).
36. SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (4th American ed. 1906).
37. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 164 (1769).
38. Id. at 164 (emphasis omitted).
39. Joseph Singer has argued strenuously that the duty at common law prior to the Civil
War to serve the public without discrimination included not just innkeepers and common
carriers but all retailers and others holding themselves out to the public. See Joseph Singer, No
Right to Exclude: Public Accomodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1303–48
(1996). His argument is weakened by the fact that he is unable to cite to a single case in which
such a duty was imposed on a party other than a common carrier or innkeeper. However, Singer
is surely correct that the common law imposed duties on market participants on the basis of
status and that at least some commercial actors at common law could not refuse to contract with
customers without cause.
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A. Antidiscrimination Law
Modern antidiscrimination laws are a product of the civil rights
movement and take racial animus as the paradigmatic case of
40
pernicious discrimination. Nevertheless, when the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 forbade racial discrimination in employment, by common
carriers, and in public accommodations, it also prohibited
41
discrimination on the basis of religion. Other antidiscrimination laws
promulgated at the federal, state, and local level similarly include
religion as a protected category. These laws replace freedom of
contract with a set of legal duties that have the effect of making
commerce both less religious and more religious or at least more
overtly pluralistic religiously. Employers can no longer refuse to
employ someone on the basis of the person’s religious beliefs, even if
42
the discrimination is religiously motivated. Likewise, state laws
prohibiting discrimination may require business owners to participate
in transactions they find religiously objectionable. Hence, a landlord
in Alaska was required to rent to an unmarried couple by

40. For example, the committee report on the House version of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 contained an exhaustive discussion of the problems faced by African Americans in seeking
employment and access to public accommodations, but contained no discussion of religious
discrimination. See generally EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1997) (collecting the committee reports and floor
debates on the Civil Rights Act). As one treatise has noted, “[e]fforts to eradicate
discrimination based on religion do not appear to be inspired by a history of economic
disadvantage of religious groups.” LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 2.04 (2d.
ed. 2014). The treatise does note the existence of widespread employment discrimination
against Jews and Catholics. See id. at § 2.04.
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012) (“All
persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined
in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of . . . religion”). Contrary
to the assumption of most laypersons and many lawyers, there is no federal law that bars
discrimination by retailers and businesses that are not public accommodations. See Singer, supra
note 39, at 1288 (“Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 regulates restaurants, innkeepers, gas
stations, and places of entertainment. Retail stores are not covered.”). Some scholars suggest
that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 might bar racial discrimination by retailers, but the Supreme
Court has never addressed the issue. Id. at 1288–89. Cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 413 (1968) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 barred private discrimination in the
sale of real estate).
42. See, e.g., Fischer v. Forestwood Co., 525 F.3d 972, 987 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding a father
liable for employment discrimination for refusing to hire his son because of the son’s apostasy
from the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints).

OMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/10/2015 12:19 PM

A LAW OF CHURCH AND MARKET

153

antidiscrimination laws despite religious objections to assisting the
43
couple to “live in sin,” a doctor in California was required to provide
fertility treatments to a lesbian couples despite religious objections to
44
homosexuality, and a photographer in New Mexico faced liability for
refusing to photograph a homosexual couple’s nuptials based on her
45
religious objections to same-sex marriage. In all of these cases, a
regime of freedom of contract would have allowed the objecting
religious actor to avoid contracting, and in all of these cases the
religiously motivated refusal to contract was in fact a legal wrong. In
such situations, antidiscrimination laws tend to exclude religious
considerations from commercial contexts.
At the same time, antidiscrimination laws can at times make
commercial contexts more rather than less religious by creating legal
support for an overtly religious albeit pluralistic market. Title VII
states that:
The term “religion” includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he
is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee’s or prospective
employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship
46
on the conduct of the employer’s business.

Employers thus have a legal obligation to accommodate the religious
practices of employees so long as doing so does not create an “undue
burden.” The Supreme Court has interpreted this standard in a way
that makes it relatively easy for employers to show the presence of
47
such a burden.
Nevertheless, the religious accommodation

43. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 847 P.2d 274, 276 (Alaska 1994)
(holding that the landlord was not entitled to a religious exemption from municipal
antidiscrimination statutes); see also Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 931
(Cal. 1996) (reaching the same conclusion under a California law analyzed under the First
Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the California state constitution).
44. See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior Court, 189 P.3d
959, 962 (Cal. 2008) (holding that the doctor’s refusal to serve the lesbian couple violated
California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act and that there was no First Amendment exemption from
the law).
45. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013) (holding that
application of the antidiscrimination statute to the photographer did not violate either state or
federal protections for religious freedom), cert. denied, 2014 WL 1343625.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012).
47. See generally Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (providing a
narrow interpretation of Title VII’s duty to accommodate religious practices); see also LARSON,
supra note 40, at §§ 56.02–56.06 (discussing the application of the Hardison standard in
accommodation litigation under Title VII).
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requirement has some bite. Hence, those with religious objections to
abortion have successfully demanded exemptions from employer
48
requirements that they provide abortion counseling. In some cases,
sabbatarians of various stripes have been able to demand different
49
work schedules to accommodate Sabbath observance. Abercrombie
& Fitch was successfully sued by a Muslim employee who objected to
50
the company’s dress code, which barred her from wearing a hijab. In
other cases, Muslim employees have successfully demanded that
employers allow them to pray five times each day, as required by
Islamic law, as well as allow an employee to make the hajj—the once
in a lifetime pilgrimage to Mecca required of all pious Muslims—
51
without losing her job. In all of these cases, employers were required
by law to take steps that made their workplaces more welcoming to
religion, in effect making commerce more rather than less religious.
Antidiscrimination laws envision a relationship between
commerce and religion that is ultimately quite different than the one
envisioned by the ideal of freedom of contract. Under a regime of
freedom of contract the market is seen as a largely “private” space,
one that need not conform to democratic norms of secular equality so
long as the relationships are consensual. In contrast, the
antidiscrimination laws rest on the view that the market is a “public”
space in at least two senses.
First, they rest on the implicit denial that the ordering of
commerce can be left to private agreements without excluding some
classes of individuals from meaningful participation in the market.

48. See Grant v. Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., No. Civ. 02-4243, 2004 WL 326694, at
*3–5 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2004) (holding that employer must provide reasonable—but not
unreasonable—accommodations to an employee with religious objections to abortion).
49. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sterling Merch. Co., 46 Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA) 1448, at *10–11
(N.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that employer must at least make an effort to accommodate the
Sabbath observance of a Jehovah’s Witness employee).
50. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores Inc., 966 F. Supp.2d 949, 971 (N.D. Cal.
2013) (holding that requiring the employers to allow the plaintiff to wear a hijab would not have
imposed an undue burden); see also Muhammad v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 450 F. Supp. 2d 198,
211–12 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that a Muslim employee was not required to wear a NYTA
baseball cap over her hijab).
51. See Hasan v. Threshold Rehab., Inc., No. 13-cv-00387, 2014 WL 1225921, at *8–9 (E.D.
Pa. 2014) (holding that plaintiff had pled sufficient facts on a failure to accommodate claim
based on her pilgrimage to Mecca); EEOC v. JBS USA LLC, 940 F. Supp.2d 949, 956–61 (D.
Neb. 2013) (detailing the efforts of employer to accommodate prayers by Muslim employees);
Haliye v. Celestica Corp., No. 06-cv-4769, 2009 WL 1653528, at *10 (D. Minn. 2009) (refusing to
certify class of Muslim employees alleging failure to accommodate religious duty to pray five
times daily).
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Defenders of antidiscrimination laws insist that “it is a distinctly
romantic notion that competition necessarily ensures that someone
52
will provide the service.” Likewise, the House Report on the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, relying on the old common law rules governing
innkeepers, stated that it was “ludicrous” to talk of the private
conduct of those subject to the law because they were “open to the
53
public in general.” According to the Report there was “little basis
for urging [the principle of freedom of association] in [sic] behalf of
54
owners of business who regularly serve the public in general.”
Second, antidiscrimination laws see the market as an important
public space from which one cannot be excluded on the basis of
certain characteristics, including religion. Like voting or a public
forum, the market is a space to which citizens have a publically
secured right of access, notwithstanding confounding “private”
arrangements. Likewise, religiously motivated commercial activity
will not be tolerated if it has the effect of inhibiting access to the
market by others. These norms are closely analogous to constitutional
rules prohibiting religious tests for public office and requiring that
55
citizens be treated equally. It is no accident that the protected classes
under antidiscrimination laws overlap substantially with the classes
56
that trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Such a
52. Singer, supra note 39, at 1329–30; see Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop
Discrimination, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 22, 22–37 (1991) (arguing that markets are not a good
system for promoting antidiscrimination practices). Richard Epstein, however, disputes this
assumption, arguing that discrimination in the Jim Crow South resulted from state action and
quasi-state action rather than market failure. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 126–27 (1995) (“No
firm could have entered the market in the face of the political forces that were arrayed against
it. The dog that did not bark gives the best evidence of pervasive government involvement in
this area.”).
53. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 40, at 2130.
54. Id.
55. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the law.”).
56. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding that racial
classifications are inherently suspect), Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948) (striking
down a law that discriminated based on national origin), Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
682 (1973) (holding that classifications on the basis of gender are subject to heightened
scrutiny), and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509 (1997) (holding the laws may not
discriminate on the basis of religion), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be an
unlawful employment practice . . . to discriminate against any individuals with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).

OMAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

4/10/2015 12:19 PM

156

[Vol. 64:141

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

view also rejects a monistic conception of the market as serving only
to efficiently allocate resources. To be sure, some have argued that
antidiscrimination laws make markets more efficient, but one
suspects that few would abandon their support for such laws even if
57
they
became
convinced
that
they
were
inefficient.
Antidiscrimination laws thus reject the notion that religious believers
should be able to pursue religious goals in the commercial sphere so
long as they do so contractually. Rather, religiously motivated
commercial activity is a legal wrong when it violates norms of equal
access to the market, even if such activity is contractual.
B. Beyond the Antidiscrimination Model
Recent debates over religious exercise by for-profit corporations
suggest a vision of the law of church and market that grows out of
antidiscrimination norms but takes a more restrictive stance toward
religion and commerce. Rather than insisting that religious norms and
freedom of contract must be subordinate to antidiscrimination norms
of universal access, this more aggressive approach suggests that there
is something presumptively suspect about religion in the for-profit
58
context. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a divided Supreme
Court ruled that for-profit corporations could claim religious
exemptions from neutral laws burdening religious exercise, in this
case regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and
Human Services requiring that certain employers provide their
employees insurance coverage for all FDA-approved forms of
contraception, including those that the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby
59
regarded as abortifacients. For purposes of this Essay, what is
57. For the debate over the efficiency of antidiscrimination laws, compare John Donohue,
Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1411–31 (1986) (arguing that Title VII is
economically efficient), with Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 513, 513–21 (1987) (expressing skepticism as to the efficiency of Title VII).
58. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
59. See id. at 2762–64 (describing the HHS mandate). I have no desire to comment on the
merits of the outcome in the case here. For the record, I largely agree with Justice Alito’s
analysis of religious exercise by corporations. Compare id. at 2768–70 (holding that for-profit
corporations can exercise religion and are “persons” for purposes of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act), with Meese & Oman, supra note 8 (arguing that for-profit corporations can
exercise religion and are “persons” for purposes of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). On
the other hand, I am critical of Justice Alito’s analysis of burdens on religious exercise imposed
by laws that create complicity in the actions of others. Compare Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at
2775–80 (holding that courts cannot inquire into the substantiality of the burden created by
forced complicity in the actions of others), with Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby: The Problem
of Complicity, THE CONGLOMERATE (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.theconglomerate.org/
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interesting about the decision is the vision of the law of church and
market revealed by the rhetoric of the losers in the case. At the
outset, it’s striking that both the majority opinion and the principal
dissent in the case invoke antidiscrimination norms. Writing for the
majority, Justice Alito claimed:
The owners of many closely held corporations could not in good
conscience provide such coverage, and thus HHS would effectively
exclude these people from full participation in the economic life of
60
the Nation. RFRA was enacted to prevent such an outcome.

Likewise, in her dissent Justice Ginsburg claimed that the Court’s
holding threatened “[t]he ability of women to participate equally in
61
the economic and social life of the Nation.”
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, however, suggests a vision of the
market in which a legally constructed pluralism precludes religiously
infused businesses. Distinguishing for-profit corporations from
62
“nonprofit religion-based organizations,” she wrote:
Religious organizations exist to foster the interests of persons
subscribing to the same religious faith. Not so of for-profit
corporations. Workers who sustain the operations of those
corporations commonly are not drawn from one religious
community. Indeed, by law, no religion-based criterion can restrict
the work force of for-profit corporations. The distinction between a
community made up of believers in the same religion and one
embracing persons of diverse beliefs, clear as it is, constantly escapes
63
the Court’s attention.

2014/03/hobby-lobby-the-problem-of-complicity.html (arguing that recognizing religious
burdens created by required complicity in the acts of others risks undermining religious
freedom), and Nathan B. Oman, Religious Freedom, Commerce, and Complicity, THE
CONGLOMERATE (July 16, 2014), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2014/07/religious-freedomcommerce-and-complicity.html (same).
60. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783. It is also worth noting that Justice Alito was eager to
reject the claim that the Court’s holding would threaten antidiscrimination laws:
The principal dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in hiring, for example
on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal
sanction. . . . The Government has a compelling interest in providing equal
opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions
on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
61. See id. at 2787–88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992)).
62. Id. at 2794.
63. Id. at 2795–96 (internal citations omitted).
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In this passage, Justice Ginsburg takes note of the way that
antidiscrimination norms structure the relationship between religion
and markets. Her claim regarding the legal impermissibility of
religious discrimination in hiring is largely correct, although in some
instances lower courts have found that religion is a bona fide
64
occupational requirement. As a factual matter, however, Justice
Ginsburg’s vision of a market consisting only of religiously pluralistic
firms devoid of a structuring religious mission is false. Such firms exist
65
and have long existed. We should thus understand it as a normative
claim rather than an empirical observation.
Similarly, some commentators have suggested that there is a kind
of social contract involved when religious believers enter the market
by creating a for-profit corporation. When they do this, so goes the
argument, they give up the ability to pursue religious goals. Writing in
response to the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, for example, Erwin
Chemerinsky argued that “[b]y creating a corporation, the owners
chose to get the benefits of having an entity separate from
themselves; they should accept the burdens of not being able to claim
66
that the business is an extension of their religious views.” As a
matter of corporate law, Chemerinsky is wrong. Under general
incorporation statutes, a corporation can be formed for “any lawful
67
purpose.” There is nothing in general business incorporation statutes
suggesting a quid pro quo in which the benefits of the corporate form
are conditioned on accepting limitations on otherwise lawful activity.
Furthermore, there is nothing in corporate law that prohibits owners
from running a corporation as “an extension of their religious

64. See Kern v. Dynaelectron, Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196, 1201 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (holding
that an employer’s requirement that an employee convert to Islam in order to work as a
helicopter pilot in the City of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, where non-Muslims can be executed, was
a bona fide occupational requirement).
65. See Meese and Oman, supra note 8, at 278–80 (providing examples of religiously
themed for-profit businesses); Sarah Barringer Gordon & Nomi Stolzenberg, Hobby Lobby,
Wheaton College, and a New Religious Order, RELIGION & POLITICS (July 14, 2014),
http://religionandpolitics.org/2014/07/14/hobby-lobby-wheaton-college-and-a-new-religiousorder (“The Methodist Book Concern, for example, whose operations were based in New York
City and Cincinnati, was the largest publishing house in the world by 1850.”).
66. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Broad Reach of the Narrow Hobby Lobby Ruling, L.A.
TIMES (June 30, 2014, 6:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-chemerinskyhobby-lobby-supreme-court-20140701-story.html.
67. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 101(b) (2014). (“A corporation may be incorporated or
organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes, except as
may otherwise be provided by the Constitution or other law of this State.”).
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68

views.” Justice Ginsburg, however, adopted an analogous view,
claiming that “for-profit corporations are different from religious
non-profits in that they use labor to make a profit, rather than to
69
perpetuate the religious values shared by a community of believers.”
For my purposes, the interest of these statements does not lie in
their empirical or legal accuracy. Rather, it lies in the strong
normative vision of the law of church and market that they present.
Although both Justice Ginsburg and Professor Chemerinsky are
making arguments about the corporate form, clearly the “for-profit”
rather than the “corporate” aspect of Hobby Lobby’s activities drives
their analysis. Justice Ginsburg, for example, goes out of her way to
note that churches, which are organized as corporations, do not fall
70
within her analysis. Furthermore, the antidiscrimination laws on
which she bases her argument are not limited to corporations but
71
include natural persons, sole proprietorships, and partnerships.
Rather, their argument rests on a vision of the relationship of religion
to the market, one in which religious considerations must be excluded
in commercial contexts—or at least marginalized—in order to ensure
that the market remains a widely accessible and largely secular
domain.
It would be dangerous, of course, to generalize too much from
the arguments surrounding the Hobby Lobby decision. It is a single
case and—as with any major Supreme Court decision—it represents
the intersection of several different strands of political and legal
argument. Nevertheless, it is a striking instance of explicit reflection
on the proper relationship between religion and commerce. Narrowly
conceived, Hobby Lobby was a pretty traditional church-state case.
Indeed, this is precisely how the majority treated it. The government
passed a law, and religious citizens claimed that the law violated their
right to exercise their religion. The case, however, was not simply
about the relationship between religious believers and the state. It
68. See Meese and Oman, supra note 8, at 281–85 (discussing the various corporate law
mechanisms for infusing a firm with religious goals and practices).
69. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797–98 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
70. See id. at 2793–95.
71. Compare id. at 2795–96 (arguing that for-profit corporations cannot represent a
community of religious believers because of the antidiscrimination requirements of Title VII),
with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person . . . .”).
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was also about the relationship between religion and commerce, and
how the law should structure that relationship. There is one
generalization from Hobby Lobby I am willing to hazard: The case
has not resolved our conflicts over the proper relationship between
church and market, and, increasingly, scholars of law and religion will
need to do more than simply recapitulate the traditional arguments
over church and state in the commercial context. Rather, they will
need to think deeply about how the law should structure markets and
the role that religion should play in that structure.
CONCLUSION
My goal in this brief Essay has been to raise a question: How
should the law structure the relationship between commerce and
religion? Helfand and Richman’s article reveals the necessity of
addressing this question directly. Importing legal theories from other
fields, in effect, creates a law of church and market without thinking
about it. Their work illustrates the costs of doing so. However, once
one begins reflecting on the law of church and market in its own
right—rather than as simply a commercial instantiation of familiar
debates over church and state—the difficulty of the issues becomes
manifest. Helfand and Richman implicitly offer contract as a
paradigm for thinking about religion and commerce. This approach,
however, is far from the only one available in our legal culture.
Antidiscrimination norms provide a powerful alternative in which the
social construction of a particular kind of market—one that is
pluralistic, open to all, and in some sense “secular”—takes priority
over freedom of contract. The tension between these two approaches
illustrates the need for more and better reflection on the relationship
between commerce and religion. Before we decide which of these
approaches is best, we must bring their assumptions out into the
open, examine them, and decide whether they are justified. This is a
task that neither scholars nor judges have yet undertaken. It is time
that they did.

